19 May 1965

MEMCRANDUM FOR: Paul Borel

SUBJECT : Fifteen-Year Plan Items

Preliminary list follows; more complete ideas will be developed later, but for this afternoon, here are some thoughts:

- (a) Resolution of the DIA-CIA bifurcation of the intelligence community. Both organizations will necessarily continue to exist, but their duplication and competition should be reduced through the strengthening of the DCI's coordinating power.
- (b) Closely allied with the foregoing, a truly effective executive committee for USIB, possibly from an extension of CCPC into a critical intelligence problems committee with the authority to monitor performances against USIB directorates. With the geometric growth of issues, USIB simply will not be able to deal with the follow-up on its own rulings, and some executive body will be needed for that purpose.
- (c) A replication for Communist China of many, if not most, of the functions developed within the community in the past 15 years against the Soviet problem. Many China problems are being handled in parallel with a current Soviet program; as the China problem becomes more and more individual and separated from the Soviet, it will command its own array of institutions and programs in the community. We should be careful to avoid the mistakes that were made with respect to Russia when it comes to dealing with the Chinese. For example, let's get started now on a concentrated linguistic training effort; Russian linguists have always been fewer than needed at every stage in the past.
- (d) A USIB entity to deal with space surveillance and space intelligence. As the Russian and Chinese efforts in space increase in magnitude, dealing with this subject will require its own institutions which will have to take over efforts now carried out in CMAIC, COMOR, and in other places.

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- our quick reaction capability will need increasing support in authority, funding, and manning. Barring a major war, we should be prepared to deal with fairly frequent and occasionally coinciding fair-size crises for which our present Ops Center's organization is only a beginning. In particular, a capability for quick dialogue with distant collectors on spot information needs must be enhanced. Progressively, I believe it will become clear during the end of the oncoming period that a central multi-department flap center will be more efficient in serving the President and his top advisors than duplicating ops centers in the services, DIA, and here. With the improvement of communications, the tendency of the President to take direct command of even individual units in the field is likely to force what I have outlined above.
- (g) An increasingly specialized effort and institutions to go with it will need to be "structuralized" for the warning business and a considerably expanded collaboration among the Commonwealth and US partners should be looked for. A distinct technique for warning of oncoming crisis situations should be developed out of the warning effort against general war, which itself will need to continue and change throughout the next 15 years.
- (h) Needless to say, no 15 year plan would be complete without a major concern with automatic data processing, but I would prefer to leave to others the directions and dimensions of what lies shead in this area.
- (i) A systematic effort should be planned to end the isolation of DD/P. With a gradual change of the character of the mission and tasks of the Clandestine Services, there should be closer support both ways between DD/P and the other two Directorates, and there should

be a greater interchange of personnel. I would hope, for example, that a way could be found toward the creation of a "general service" career group which would represent those of us who could be assigned with relatively little preparation to tasks here and abroad in both DD/I and DD/P, and perhaps to some DD/S&T jobs.

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